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SEE NO EVIL, HEAR NO EVIL, SPEAK NO EVIL; 
STEMMING THE TIDE OF NO PROMO HOMO
LAWS IN AMERICAN SCHOOLS
By: Madelyn Rodriguez1
“When someone with the authority of a teacher, say, 
describes the world and you are not in it, there is a 
moment of psychic disequilibrium, as if you looked 
into a mirror and saw nothing.”2
I. Introduction
The average primary school student spends 
the majority of his or her waking hours in school.3 
The school experience plays a monumental role in 
determining a child’s worldview.4 It is no surprise, 
then, that the issue of what to teach in schools is 
a perennial conflict, especially when it relates to 
homosexuality.5 Several states and many more local 
governments have implemented policies prohibiting 
any instruction given to students that could be 
interpreted as portraying homosexuality in a positive 
light.6 These policies, often referred to as “No Promo 
Homo” policies, have been accused of contributing 
to what is an already toxic environment for many 
students.7 To illustrate the possible effects of these 
laws, consider the following hypothetical :
John is a middle school student in 
Arizona. He has two gay dads. John’s 
science teacher, Ms. Smith, spends a 
class teaching the required Arizona 
sex education and AIDS curriculum. 
In order to comply with the law she 
is required to promote abstinence and 
dispel myths about the transmission 
of HIV. Further, she is not permitted 
to promote the homosexual life-style, 
promote homosexuality as a positive 
alternative or suggest that some meth-
ods of homosexual sex are safe. During 
the class, some students begin to taunt 
John because of his two gay dads. 
The other students ridicule John with 
taunts that he is gay too and his dads 
surely must have AIDS. Ms. Smith has 
never received any training on how to 
teach these subjects or how to handle 
students bullying other students. She 
is unsure of whether to step in and 
stop the taunts because she is afraid 
anything she says to defend John and 
his family could be construed as a pro-
motion of homosexuality. As a result, 
she ignores the taunts and continues 
her lesson. After class, Ms. Smith sees 
students still ridiculing and harassing 
John in the hallways. She looks on, but 
does not step in to stop it, still unsure 
of what doing so would mean for her 
employment. This is not the first time 
John has been subjected to harassment 
at school, but John does not report it 
because he does not believe anything 
will be done. 
The above hypothetical  illustrates some of 
the questions raised by state and local laws prohibiting 
the promotion of homosexuality. Teachers are left 
to ask what they are and are not permitted to do. 
Specifically, they are left to determine whether 
interceding and stopping anti-gay bullying might 
be construed as promoting homosexuality as an 
acceptable alternative. Is a teacher like Ms. Smith even 
permitted to tell students that having two parents of 
the same gender is not something to harass someone 
for, or could this too be considered promoting 
homosexuality?
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II. Background
A. No Promo Homo: Origins
The gay rights movement has been a 
catalyst for controversy and social change since its 
inception.23 Traditionally, anti-gay arguments have 
emerged from religious doctrine, medical opinions, 
or social stigmatization.24 More recently however, 
a new anti-gay rhetoric has enjoyed tremendous 
success.25 These arguments are broadly referred to 
as “no promotion of homosexuals” or “no promo 
homo.”26 Professor William N. Eskridge, Jr., has 
written extensively on the topic 27 and describes the 
following underlying logic behind No Promo Homo: 
if the state adopts a law giving rights to homosexuals 
or protecting homosexuality it is thereby promoting 
homosexuality.28 It should be the state’s purpose to 
promote good conduct and discourage conduct that 
is not as good.29 Because homosexuality is not as good 
as heterosexuality, laws should not be adopted giving 
rights to homosexuals or protecting homosexuality.30 
These sorts of arguments and policies are 
especially pervasive in education.31 No Promo Homo 
educational policies are “local or state educational 
policies which restrict or eliminate any school based 
instruction or activity that could be interpreted as 
positive about homosexuality.”32 These policies may 
be worded in a manner so as to prohibit promotion 
of homosexuality or go further and ban all discussion 
of homosexuality.33 These policies help to further 
reinforce many of the myths and misconceptions 
about homosexuality that still persist in society at 
large.34
Some supporters of these laws argue that 
the purpose of not promoting homosexuality is to 
protect children who are wavering in their sexual 
identity and may be swayed towards homosexuality 
if it were to be promoted or discussed in school.35 
Proponents maintain that if teachers or schools are 
allowed to discuss homosexuality, it will signal to 
children that such behavior is acceptable; thereby 
serving to “indoctrinate” children into believing 
non-heterosexuality is acceptable.36 However, 
forcing schools and teachers not to promote, or 
even acknowledge, that homosexuality exists as an 
alternative ignores the reality of society at large.37 
Although many No Promo Homo policies claim to 
The issue of maintaining an open and safe 
environment for all children in school should be of 
serious concern to parents, educators, society, and 
the law.8 Given that teachers will inevitably leave 
an immeasurable impression on the values, morals, 
and opinions of the children whom they teach, the 
question becomes one of which values should be 
taught.9 By and large, there have been two separate 
views in the debate over student instruction.10 The 
traditional view believes that the school is tasked 
with inculcating students with a prescribed set of 
norms and values, usually the status quo.11 The 
more liberal view believes that schools should act as 
a sort of “marketplace of ideas.”12 This view tends 
to eschew the inculcation of traditional values and 
instead seeks to allow each teacher the freedom to 
introduce differing perspectives and allow for debate 
within the classroom.13 Logically then, it is clear that 
the traditional view endorses more limitations on 
teachers and other school officials, while the modern, 
liberal view tends to endorse the right of the teachers 
to present differing perspectives.14  
Generally the courts, while recognizing the 
need for the free exchange of ideas, have found that 
the political body should be given the authority to 
decide what values should be taught and which should 
not.15 While this is a reasonable view, a problem 
arises when the government, through its schools, 
is permitted to dictate a set of “right” and “wrong” 
values.16 The imposition of a set system of beliefs and 
values prescribed by government officials from above 
is naturally susceptible to abuse.17 This article will 
argue that the imposition of No Promo Homo laws 
in schools violates the Equal Protection Clause and 
further encourages the bullying and harassment of 
Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender (“LGBT”)18 
students, resulting in even more egregious violations 
of the Equal Protection Clause. Part II explores 
the origins and implications of No Promo Homo 
laws.19 Part III then provides an overview of select 
No Promo Homo Laws.20 Part IV outlines current 
jurisprudence under the Equal Protection Clause of 
the United States Constitution and argues that No 
Promo Homo policies in schools violate the Equal 
Protection Clause.21 Lastly, Part V proposes several 
possible responses available to mitigate the effect of 
No Promo Homo educational policies, and alleviate 
their long-lasting and damaging effects on students.22
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be grounded in the idea that children should not be 
taught about sex at school,38 sexual identity has become 
a major issue, even for younger children.39 Children 
may already be aware of their own homosexuality,40 
and increasing visibility of openly gay individuals 
in the media and within many families ensures 
that homosexuality will not merely go away if it is 
ignored in schools.41 California seems to be the leader 
in understanding the importance of acknowledging 
the LGBT community in schools, recently passing 
the FAIR Education Act which will require LGBT 
inclusive curriculum.42 
B. Effects of Stigmatization on LGBT Students
Homosexuality continues to be a divisive 
issue in American politics.43 Although approval of 
homosexuality by the American public has followed 
an upward trend, there remains a very substantial 
segment of the public that continues to disapprove 
of homosexuality.44 Further, although homosexuality 
has been accepted by more Americans as a whole, 
many in the LGBT community continue to keep 
their sexuality a secret due to fear of retribution and 
rejection.45 These fears and continued disapproval 
of homosexuality are likely bolstered by what 
some commenters have termed “heterosexism” or 
“heterocentrism.”46 The terms refer to a system of 
bias which regards heterosexuality as the “normative 
form of human sexuality and thereby connotes 
prejudice against anyone who falls outside of that 
form.”47 Although heterosexism is a pervasive part 
of virtually every facet of society, schools may play 
an exceptionally important part in either continuing 
to foster heterosexism or limiting its continued 
viability, due to the role of schools as an agent for 
socialization.48 A teacher in a school district which 
adopted a No Promo Homo policy stated that “[i]f 
you can’t talk about it in any context, which is how 
teachers interpret district policies, kids internalize 
that to mean that being gay must be so shameful 
and wrong, and that has created a climate of fear and 
repression and harassment.”49 Although researchers 
have studied the links between heterosexism in schools 
and its effect on students,50 it was not until a rash of 
suicides by LGBT students in recent years that the 
issue received any significant media attention.51 The 
issue has gained such attention that the United States 
Department of Education has begun to take a more 
proactive role in ensuring that schools protect LGBT 
students to the full extent required by the law.52   
A 2009 survey of middle and high school 
students found that eighty-four percent of LGBT 
youth experienced harassment at school the previous 
year.53 LGBT young adults who reported high levels 
of bullying during middle and high school are 5.6 
times more likely to attempt suicide, and 2.6 times 
more likely to have clinical levels of depression.54 A 
study of the higher rate of suicides in LGBT youth 
identified several related factors such as stigma and 
discrimination, especially acts such as rejection or 
abuse by peers, bullying, harassment, and denunciation 
from religious communities.55 The report also 
presented “evidence that discriminatory laws and 
public policies have a profound negative impact on 
the mental health of gay adults.”56 When questioned 
as to their experiences in school, LGBT students in 
states with No Promo Homo policies reported much 
less support from teachers and administrators as 
compared to student support in states without No 
Promo Homo policies.57 Additionally, students from 
states with No Promo Homo laws were less likely to 
report having LGBT-related resources in school, such 
as comprehensive school harassment/assault policies, 
school personnel supportive of LGBT students, and 
Gay-Straight Alliances.58  
LGBT youth already face substantial 
adversity in schools.59 Denying teachers and school 
administrators the ability to present homosexuality 
as an acceptable alternative to students only serves 
to further exacerbate the problems already faced by 
LGBT students.60 The inability to maintain an open 
environment for students to explore themselves 
and learn about diversity among their peers will 
further perpetuate school atmospheres tinged with 
homophobia.61 
III. State of the Law
A. Current State Laws
States have almost exclusive power to run 
their schools, and are thus entitled to almost unfettered 
discretion with regard to selection and implementation 
of school policies and curriculum.62 Several states 
and local districts have implemented some variation 
of No Promo Homo policies. Among these are 
THE MODERN AMERICAN32
Alabama, Arizona, Louisiana, Mississippi, Oklahoma, 
South Carolina, Texas, and Utah.63 Each effectively 
mandates that heterosexuality be emphasized as the 
only acceptable lifestyle.64 Acknowledgment of the 
possibility of a healthy homosexual lifestyle would 
violate the policies.65 Generally, the statutes can be 
divided into two categories, with the first explicitly 
barring positive discussion of homosexuality66 and 
the second employing a more subtle approach.67 The 
Arizona statute, for example, proscribes instruction 
that “promotes” a homosexual life-style, “portrays” 
homosexuality as an alternative life-style, or “suggests” 
that some methods of homosexual sex are safe.68 
Conversely, the South Carolina statute, for example, 
mandates that students only receive instruction 
regarding homosexuality in the context of sexually 
transmitted diseases.69 This prohibition essentially 
forecloses any possibility that homosexuality 
be portrayed as an acceptable alternative to 
heterosexuality. Further, the vast majority of these 
policies emphasize that abstinence before marriage is 
the only viable option.70  One commentator added: 
[A]s ineffective as abstinence-only-
until-marriage education is in 
protecting adolescents in general, 
it is wholly inapplicable to gay and 
lesbian adolescents . . . . [S]tudents 
are told they must remain abstinent 
until they are married. This seems 
somewhat cruel, as there is a certain 
percentage of these students who 
may have no legal opportunity to 
engage in marriage: students who 
are lesbian or gay. In effect, these 
students are being told that they 
should never have sex.71
The state policies are as follows: 
Alabama: “Any program or curricu-
lum in the public schools in Alabama 
that includes sex education or the 
human reproductive process shall, as 
a minimum, include and emphasize 
the following: [a]bstinence from 
sexual intercourse outside of law-
ful marriage is the expected social 
standard for unmarried school-age 
persons . . . .Course materials and 
instruction that relate to sexual 
education or sexually transmitted 
diseases should include all of the 
following elements: an emphasis, in 
a factual manner and from a public 
health perspective, that homosexual-
ity is not a lifestyle acceptable to the 
general public and that homosexual 
conduct is a criminal offense under 
the laws of the state.”72
a. Arizona: “No district shall include in 
its course of study instruction which: 1. 
Promotes a homosexual life-style; 2. Portrays 
homosexuality as a positive alternative life-
style; 3. Suggests that some methods of sex 
are safe methods of homosexual sex.”73 
b. Louisiana: “No sex education course offered 
in the public schools of the state shall utilize 
any sexually explicit materials depicting 
male or female homosexual activity . . . 
Emphasize abstinence from sexual activity 
outside of marriage as the expected standard 
for all school-age children.”74
c. Mississippi: “Abstinence-only education shall 
remain the state standard for any sex-related 
education taught in the public schools. For 
purposes of this section, abstinence-only 
education includes any type of instruction 
or program which, at an appropriate age 
. . . [t]eaches the current state law related 
to sexual conduct, including forcible rape, 
statutory rape, paternity establishment, 
child support and homosexual activity . 
. . and teaches that a mutually faithful, 
monogamous relationship in the context of 
marriage is the only appropriate setting for 
sexual intercourse.”75
d. Oklahoma: “AIDS prevention education 
shall specifically teach students that: 
1. engaging in homosexual activity, 
promiscuous sexual activity, intravenous 
drug use or contact with contaminated 
blood products is now known to be 
primarily responsible for contact with 
the AIDS virus; 2. avoiding the activities 
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specified in paragraph 1 of this subsection is 
the only method of preventing the spread of 
the virus.”76
e. South Carolina: “The program of instruction 
provided for in this section may not include 
a discussion of alternative sexual lifestyles 
from heterosexual relationships including, 
but not limited to, homosexual relationships 
except in the context of instruction 
concerning sexually transmitted diseases.”77
f. Texas: “Course materials and instruction 
relating to sexual education or sexually 
transmitted diseases should include: 
emphasis, provided in a factual manner 
and from a public health perspective, that 
homosexuality is not a lifestyle acceptable 
to the general public and that homosexual 
conduct is a criminal offense under Section 
21.06, Penal Code.”78
g. Utah: “[T]he materials adopted by a local 
school board . . . shall be based upon 
recommendations of the school district’s 
Curriculum Materials Review Committee 
that comply with state law and state 
board rules emphasizing abstinence before 
marriage and fidelity after marriage, and 
prohibiting instruction in: the advocacy of 
homosexuality. . . the advocacy of sexual 
activity outside of marriage.”79
B. Vagueness
One of the striking aspects of some of 
the more blatant No Promo Homo policies is 
just how vague they really are.80 The Arizona 
law states that teachers may not “promote,” 
“portray,” or “suggest” certain aspects relating to 
the homosexual “life-style.”81 The school staff 
charged with abiding by these policies must then 
determine exactly what conduct or instruction 
would constitute promotion, portrayal, or 
suggestion. The term “life-style” is just as 
ineffective, in that it has no accepted meaning.82 
Thus, the meaning of the term, and by extension 
the policy, becomes susceptible to a wide array of 
interpretations that can be manipulated in kind 
with desired outcomes.83 It may in fact be another 
example of the conflation between sexual identity 
and sexual behavior, a distortion that is common 
in society and the legal realm.84 Compounding 
all of this is the fact that no guidance is normally 
provided to help teachers determine acceptable 
standards of instruction or responses.85  
C. Most Recent Policies
Recently, two policies were thrust into the 
media spotlight. The first was a local policy in effect 
in Annoka-Hennepin, Minnesota.86 The Sexual 
Orientation Curriculum Policy (“SOCP”) stated in 
part: 
Teaching about sexual orientation is not a 
part of the District adopted curriculum; rather, such 
matters are best addressed within individual family 
homes, churches, or community organizations. 
Anoka-Hennepin staff, in the course of their 
professional duties, shall remain neutral on matters 
regarding sexual orientation including but not limited 
to student led discussions.87 
The SOCP was predated by an official 
memo promulgated by the District which declared 
that “homosexuality [is] not to be taught/addressed 
as a normal, valid lifestyle.”88 Written guidance from 
the Anoka-Hennepin School District made clear 
that the term “sexual orientation” in the SOCP was 
intended to bar discussion of homosexuality, but 
not heterosexuality.89 In a lawsuit on behalf of five 
former and current students of the Anoka-Hennepin 
School District, the Southern Poverty Law Center 
and National Center for Lesbian Rights alleged that 
the SOCP violated student rights under the Equal 
Protection Clause, the Fourteenth Amendment of 
the United States Constitution, Title IX, and the 
Minnesota Human Rights Act.90 The plaintiffs 
pointed to evidence of bullying and harassment that 
went unchecked by teachers and administrators, 
who were inadequately trained to deal with anti-
gay bullying due to the “neutrality” policy.91 The 
plaintiffs alleged that one administrator told parents 
that the School District handles issues of racial 
harassment differently from harassment based on 
sexual orientation.92 Plaintiffs also pointed out that 
during the nine month period between November 
2009 and July 2010, at least four LGBT or perceived 
LGBT students in the Anoka-Hennepin School 
District committed suicide.93 After several months, 
the School District and the Plaintiffs entered into a 
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consent decree.94 Under the decree, the School Board 
agreed to implement a program with significant 
protections for LGBT students, with the aim of 
preventing bullying and creating a more accepting 
environment.95 Of particular importance, the School 
District specifically agreed to repeal its SOCP, and 
made clear that school officials may affirm the self-
worth of students, including their status as LGBT.96 
Another policy that garnered substantial 
attention was Tennessee’s proposed law, dubbed the 
“Don’t Say Gay” bill.97 The original bill would have 
banned teachers from “provid[ing] any instruction 
or material that discusses sexual orientation other 
than heterosexuality.”98 The bill was later amended 
and would have required curriculum to be “limited 
exclusively to age-appropriate natural human 
reproduction science.”99 The bill’s Senate sponsor, 
Senator Stacey Campfield, made it clear that the 
change in the language of the bill was merely a way 
to get the bill passed by assuaging fellow Senators 
uneasy with viability of the original language.100 He 
was confident that the altered language would be just 
as effective in barring discussion of homosexuality, 
stating, “There’s more than one way to skin a cat. 
This skins the cat, but doesn’t scare [other legislators] 
so much.”101 The bill’s House sponsor, Representative 
Jon Hensley stated, “I have two children — in the 
third- and fourth-grade — and [I] don’t want them 
to be exposed to things I don’t agree with . . . .”102 
The Tennessee Senate approved the bill in late 2011, 
but the bill died in May 2012 when the House of 
Representatives failed to vote on it before the end of 
the legislative session.103  
Although it did not garner nearly as much 
media attention, legislators in Missouri, taking 
the lead from Tennessee, introduced a similar 
Don’t Say Gay bill.104 The law would have banned 
teachers from talking about any sexuality other 
than heterosexuality and would have also banned 
any extracurricular activities that would do the 
same.105 It stated, “Notwithstanding any other 
law to the contrary, no instruction, material, or 
extracurricular activity sponsored by a public school 
that discusses sexual orientation other than in 
scientific instruction concerning human reproduction 
shall be provided in any public school.”106 
Tennessee and Missouri’s Don’t Say Gay bills illustrate 
that No Promo Homo school policies are not just a 
vestige of past anti-gay rhetoric, but instead continue 
to find support from certain sizeable segments of 
legislators and citizens alike.
IV. Equal Protection Clause
A. Constitutional Standard
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution requires that “No state shall . . . 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws.”107 The Equal Protection Clause 
gives Congress the power to enforce this right, “but 
absent controlling congressional direction, the courts 
have themselves devised standards for determining the 
validity of state legislation or other official action that 
is challenged as denying equal protection.”108 Under 
this framework, the basic constitutional question is 
whether the challenged government action is justified 
by a sufficient purpose.109  
When a government action is challenged 
under the Equal Protection Clause, three inquiries 
should be made: First, what is the classification? 
Second, what is the appropriate level of scrutiny? 
Third, does the government action meet the level of 
scrutiny?110 
The Supreme Court of the United States 
has interpreted the Equal Protection Clause to afford 
differing levels of protection to various groups.111 
Classifications such as race, alienage, and national 
origin are entitled to strict scrutiny.112 Laws found 
to be discriminatory against a classification subject 
to strict scrutiny will be “sustained only if they are 
suitably tailored to serve a compelling state interest.”113 
Strict scrutiny is usually fatal to the challenged law 
because the government must have a truly significant 
reason for the discrimination.114 Classifications such 
as gender and illegitimacy are entitled to intermediate 
scrutiny.115 Intermediate scrutiny will result in the law 
being upheld if the government can establish that the 
discrimination is substantially related to an important 
government purpose.116  
All other classifications, including sexual 
orientation, are reviewed based on a rational basis 
standard.117 A classification “must be upheld against 
equal protection challenge if there is any reasonably 
conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational 
basis for the classification.”118 This imposes on a 
plaintiff the burden of refuting any and all possible 
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justifications for the challenged law.119 As a result, 
rational basis review is a very difficult standard for 
a challenger to meet. This is especially evident when 
looking at the outcomes of equal protection clause 
claims; between 1973 and 1996, the United States 
Supreme Court upheld over a hundred classifications 
on rational review basis, while invalidating less than a 
dozen classifications under this review.120
It is undeniable that the level of scrutiny a 
group is entitled to will be extremely influential in 
the outcome of any particular legal classification.121 
Although the factors involved in determining the 
level of scrutiny a classification is entitled to have not 
been clearly established, some general patterns have 
emerged.122 Thus, a court will likely consider whether 
the involved group is a “discrete and insular” minority, 
whether the group is defined by an immutable 
characteristic, whether the group has been subjected 
to a history of discrimination, whether the group is 
“politically powerless,” and whether the government 
classification is related to the group’s functioning in 
society.123 Groups who meet these criteria may then 
be entitled to suspect or quasi-suspect classification.124 
It has been the aim of many minority groups 
who are only entitled to rational review to attempt 
to convince the court to afford their classification an 
upgrade to require heightened scrutiny via a suspect 
or quasi-suspect classification.125 However, these 
classifications have remained relatively unaltered 
over time, and are likely to remain so, due to the 
Supreme Court’s reluctance to acknowledge new 
suspect or quasi-suspect classifications even where 
the group appears to have fulfilled the factors that 
would ostensibly entitle them to such treatment.126 
Additionally, the Court has been reluctant to 
recognize new fundamental Constitutional rights, 
which would likely lead to a blitz of challenges to 
state and local laws.127 Recent cases, however, indicate 
that the rational basis review has been given “a bite” 
resulting in a sort of quasi-heightened scrutiny for 
classifications such as sexual orientation.128 Thus, it 
is my contention that this shift in analysis, if applied 
to No Promo Homo laws in schools, would be 
more likely to result in a finding that these laws are 
unconstitutional.129  
B. Rational Review With a Bite
Much has been said about the consistency 
of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions regarding 
rational review in the context of the Equal Protection 
Clause.130 The standard two-step test requires that: 
1) the legislature pursue a legitimate goal; and 2) the 
means chosen to attain that goal are not arbitrary 
or irrational.131 Thus, if a court finds any plausible 
government interests and can conceive of reasons 
to support the government’s methods for achieving 
those interests, the law will survive Constitutional 
scrutiny.132  
While this test is fairly straightforward, the 
rational review standard has become increasingly 
difficult for the Court to implement in a consistent 
manner.133 Under what has been termed “second 
order” rational review or “rational review with a 
bite,” the Court does not defer to the judgment of 
the legislature, but instead conducts an “inquiry into 
whether given the benefits of the statute, the statute 
reflects a rational accommodation of interests.”134 
In implementing a more equitable, balancing-type 
approach, the Court is effectively eschewing the 
dictates of rational review, and instead, applying 
some formulation of the more stringent heightened 
review. In his concurring opinion in City of Cleburne 
v. Cleburne Living Center, Justice Marshall chastised 
the majority’s reasoning, stating: 
[T]he Court’s heightened-scrutiny 
discussion is even more puzzling 
given that Cleburne’s ordinance is 
invalidated only after being sub-
jected to precisely the sort of probing 
inquiry associated with heightened 
scrutiny. To be sure, the Court does 
not label its handiwork heightened 
scrutiny, and perhaps the method 
employed must hereafter be called 
“second order” rational-basis review 
rather than “heightened scrutiny.” 
But however labeled, the rational 
basis test invoked today is most 
assuredly not the rational-basis test 
of [precedent].135  
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Almost two decades later, in another 
concurring opinion, Justice O’Conner seemed to 
echo Justice Marshall’s observations, albeit in a 
more approving manner. In Lawrence v. Texas,136 the 
Court declared a Texas statute criminalizing same-
sex sodomy was unconstitutional under the Due 
Process Clause.137 While the majority refused to strike 
down the law based on the Equal Protection Clause, 
the Court acknowledged that it was a “tenable” 
argument.138 In her concurring opinion, Justice 
O’Connor argued that “[w]hen a law exhibits such 
a desire to harm a politically unpopular group, [the 
Court has] applied a more searching form of rational 
basis review to strike down such laws under the Equal 
Protection Clause.”139 Although the Lawrence statute 
was invalidated under the Due Process Clause, the 
Court’s reasoning echoes the reasoning found in 
several critical “rational review with a bite” cases.140 
Three cases, discussed in detail below, are especially 
poignant in the analysis of modern Equal Protection 
Clause jurisprudence under rational review: United 
States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, Cleburn v. 
Cleburn Living Center, and Romer v. Evans.141 
1. United States Department of  
Agriculture v. Moreno
Moreno involved an Equal Protection Clause 
challenge to a provision of the Food Stamp Act of 
1964, which excluded distribution of food stamps to 
any household containing an unrelated individual.142 
A class of plaintiffs barred from receiving benefits 
because of their household make-up filed suit, 
alleging the requirement was discriminatory and 
contrary to the Equal Protection Clause.143 Because 
the plaintiffs were not one of the classifications 
entitled to heightened scrutiny, the Court evaluated 
the challenged law under rational basis review.144  
Of particular importance in the case was the 
legislative history of the Food Stamp Act of 1964.145 
A House report indicated that the intent behind 
the relation requirement was to prevent “hippies” 
and “hippie communes” from receiving benefits.146 
The Court rejected the government’s argument that 
the exclusionary classification was an effort to curb 
fraud, instead finding that the classification did not 
bear enough relation with the stated intent for the 
reasoning to be credible.147 The Court held that absent 
any other justification, the Food Stamp Act’s relation 
requirement could not be upheld based on this 
purpose.148 Writing for the majority, Justice Brennan 
declared that “if the constitutional conception of 
‘equal protection of the laws’ means anything, it 
must at the very least mean that a bare congressional 
desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot 
constitute a legitimate governmental interest.”149 
Moreno establishes that while rational review is a very 
relaxed standard, there are some instances where there 
is really no rational basis for the government action.150
2. Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center
Cleburne involved a city ordinance requiring a 
special use permit for the construction of hospitals for 
the insane, feeble-minded, alcoholics or drug addicts, 
or penal or correctional institutions.151 The Cleburne 
Living Center sought a permit to build a home for the 
mentally retarded.152 When the city council denied 
the permit, the Cleburne Living Center filed suit, 
challenging the validity of the ordinance, and arguing 
that it discriminated against the mentally retarded and 
violated the Equal Protection Clause.153 The district 
court found that mental retardation was neither a 
suspect class nor a quasi-suspect class, and was instead 
subject to rational review.154 Applying rational review, 
the district court found that the ordinance was 
rationally related to the city’s legitimate interests in 
protecting the community and the mentally retarded 
and thus found the ordinance to be constitutional.155 
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals determined that 
mental retardation was a quasi-suspect classification 
and thus subject to an intermediate level of scrutiny.156
The Supreme Court of the United States 
held that mental retardation was only entitled to 
rational basis review, not heightened scrutiny.157 The 
Court was hesitant to set out a standard that would 
expand the classifications entitled to strict scrutiny, 
due to the difficulty that could arise in where to 
draw to the line.158 Even subject to only rational 
review, the Supreme Court was unwilling to accept 
the City’s reasoning for the law.159 The Court found 
that the city’s reasoning was based on “mere negative 
attitudes or fear” which was not a rational basis 
for the legislative action.160 The Court found that 
where the permit requirement rested on “irrational 
prejudice,” the ordinance was plainly contrary to the 
requirements of the Equal Protection Clause.161
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3. Romer v. Evans
In 1992, Colorado voters approved 
Amendment 2, a constitutional provision prohibiting 
any state action designed to protect homosexuals 
from discrimination.162 A suit was filed by several 
government employees and private citizens 
challenging the amendment on the basis of the Equal 
Protection Clause.163 The district court ruled that the 
amendment was subject to strict scrutiny because of 
its infringement on the rights of gays and lesbians 
from participating in the political process.164 The state 
attempted to make the argument that Amendment 2 
was designed to serve compelling interests; however, 
the court was not persuaded.165 The Supreme Court 
of Colorado affirmed the ruling and the United States 
Supreme Court granted certiorari.166  
In its ruling striking the amendment, 
the Court rejected Colorado’s argument that by 
prohibiting protections for gays and lesbians, the 
State was merely ensuring that everyone was placed 
on equal ground.167 Emphasizing the fact that the law 
specifically singled out only homosexuals, and had an 
extensive effect upon the legal rights of homosexuals, 
the Court found that even if the amendment was only 
subject to rational review, the law was still violative 
of even this lenient standard.168 Amendment 2 was 
found to be unconstitutional because it “imposed 
a ‘broad and undifferentiated disability’ on a single 
group and harbored ‘animus’ toward a class of 
people.”169 The Romer Court’s finding of a violation 
of the Equal Protection Clause even under rational 
review was a significant development in Equal 
Protection jurisprudence.170   
C. Rational Review With A Bite as Applied to No 
Promo Homo Laws
In determining the level of scrutiny afforded 
to various classifications, the Court has pointed to 
several important considerations, such as whether the 
group is a discrete and insular minority, whether the 
group is defined by an immutable characteristic, and 
whether the group has been subjected to a history of 
discrimination.171 Although LGBT people are likely 
to fulfill most of these factors, it is unlikely that 
LGBT people will be afforded strict scrutiny, due 
to a general reluctance to accept new strict scrutiny 
classifications.172 However, because the Supreme 
Court has effectively closed off this avenue, the Court 
seems more willing to afford classifications entitled 
to rational review a more probing analysis.173 This 
rational review with a bite standard would likely be 
the standard applied to No Homo Promo policies 
challenged under the Equal Protection Clause.174  
Rational review with a bite cases such as 
Moreno, Cleburne, and Romer established that even 
where the Court ostensibly defers to the judgment 
of the government, not every justification will be 
sufficient.175 In each case, the Court found evidence 
of some ulterior basis for the classification, essentially 
some sort of bias or animus against the group.  
In the case of Tennessee’s proposed “Don’t 
Say Gay Bill,” the words of one of the bill’s sponsors, 
Senator Stacey Campfield, were especially telling. 
In a radio interview discussing his proposed bill, 
responding to a question concerning the prevalence 
of bullying of LGBT students in schools, he stated 
“[t]he bullying thing is the biggest lark out there.”176 
Regarding homosexuality, he stated, “[i]t happens 
in nature, but so does bestiality, that does not make 
it right or something we should be teaching in 
school.”177 Further he asserted that “it is virtually, 
not completely, but virtually, impossible to contract 
AIDS through heterosexual sex . . . very rarely 
[transmitted].”178 As the sponsor of law which was 
supposedly intended to protect children from the 
dangers of sexual activity and sexually transmitted 
diseases, Senator Campfield’s statements are not only 
false, they are downright dangerous.179
With regard to No Promo Homo policies 
in general, it will be difficult for the government 
to provide any justification beyond that of moral 
opposition to homosexuality. Even though some 
of the policies are proffered in the context of sex 
education or AIDS education, the central policies do 
not seem to have an interest in actually preventing 
the transmission of sexually transmitted diseases.180 It 
is completely implausible to assert that no method of 
homosexual sex is safe. If the state was truly interested 
in preventing the spread of sexually transmitted 
diseases, as would be the likely justification for the law 
should it be challenged, they might actually provide 
instruction on methods of safe homosexual sex, just as 
they would do for heterosexual sex. Furthermore, the 
language of the policies evidences an animus against 
LGBT people.181 These laws make it clear that the aim 
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of the policy is to deter homosexuality by stigmatizing 
and demeaning it. It is striking that the policies require 
that teachers emphasize that homosexual conduct is a 
criminal offense,182 in spite of the fact that the United 
States Supreme Court struck down Texas’s own law 
banning same-sex sodomy in Lawrence v. Texas.183 As 
a result, these policies violate the Equal Protection 
Clause because they do not have any viable rational 
justifications as written. 
V. Challenging No Promo Homo
The aim of those fighting to eliminate No 
Promo Homo policies in schools is not to recruit 
young children into a homosexual “lifestyle,” as some 
have argued.184 Instead, the aim is to remove just one of 
the many legal and social barriers to equality. Because 
the school plays such an influential role in children’s 
lives, No Promo Homo policies can be especially 
destructive to children who identify or are perceived 
as LGBT.185 The recent media attention on two No 
Promo Homo policies indicates the time is ripe to 
bring further challenges to the laws.186 The Annoka-
Hennepin School District lawsuit and subsequent 
settlement, which agreed to repeal its policy regarding 
LGBT students, and allow for the affirmation of 
students’ LGBT status, could be instrumental in 
spurring similar challenges to other No Promo Homo 
policies around the United States, or even encourage 
some states or districts to reconsider and repeal their 
No Promo Homo policies.187 The threat of possible 
negative media attention and litigation costs involved 
in defending such a policy might also help to prevent 
No Promo Homo policies from being adopted by 
other schools and legislators. It is also important 
to note that some of the statewide No Promo 
Homo policies have been challenged by subsequent 
legislators.188 Media coverage of these efforts could 
help increase support for these repeal measures.
In addition, another promising response to 
local and state level No Promo Homo educational 
policies is federal intervention. Although, education 
has traditionally been within the purview of state 
and local government,189 recent federal legislation, 
such as the No Child Left Behind Act and the Race 
to the Top Fund, indicates a possible trend towards 
standardization of educational programs across 
the United States.190 Continued pressure from the 
Department of Education could help lead to a change 
in policy. Alternatively, the Department could issue 
guidance on the topic of how teachers can abide by 
these policies while still ensuring the safety and well-
being of students.   
Moreover, the Department of Education 
can continue to lobby for federal anti-bullying 
legislation that specifically covers sexual orientation 
and gender identity. Two such bills, The Student 
Non-Discrimination Act and the Safe Schools 
Improvement Act, have been introduced and met 
with approval from LGBT activists and educators.191 
Although similar legislation192 has failed in the past, 
the hope is that eventually there will be enough 
political support to have such a law passed. These 
protections would send the signal that even if No 
Promo Homo laws remain on the books, this will not 
excuse ignoring the destructive results they may have 
on students. This would also force school officials to 
evaluate their programs to ensure compliance with the 
law. Ultimately the best anti-bullying policies prevent 
bullying rather than punish it severely after the fact.193 
VI. Conclusion
No Promo Homo policies continue to enjoy 
prevalence in classrooms around the country.194 
Those who support these policies applaud them for 
presumably protecting children from homosexuality. 
Those who oppose the policies argue that these 
laws unfairly target a vulnerable group, and that 
children should be entitled to accurate information. 
Accordingly, it is unsurprising that battles over what 
students are exposed to in the classroom, especially 
with regard to homosexuality, engender strong 
opinions on both sides of the aisle. Complicating 
the issue, or perhaps resulting from it, the incidence 
of bullying and stigmatization of students who are 
LGBT or are perceived to be LGBT demonstrates 
the urgency required in dealing with this issue.195 The 
failure of schools to address or support students who 
are LGBT or may come from an LGBT family likely 
contributes to the stigmatization of those students.  
Ultimately, however, those states and local 
governments who continue to enforce curricular 
requirements banning the discussion or promotion 
of homosexuality, are likely violating the rights of 
students themselves. These policies stigmatize one 
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class of people, based on nothing more than political 
and social animus against them.196 Although sexual 
orientation has not been acknowledged as a strict 
scrutiny classification under the relevant Equal 
Protection Clause jurisprudence, it appears that 
sexual orientation fits squarely within the enumerated 
requirements for strict scrutiny, and should be classified 
as such.197 However, even if the Court continues 
its reluctance to grant strict scrutiny review to new 
classifications, it would appear that No Promo Homo 
policies still violate the Equal Protection Clause, even 
when only entitled to rational basis review. Although 
rational basis review is a very deferential standard, 
the Supreme Court has shown that although it may 
be applying rational review, there does seem to be a 
willingness to give it a bite, thus requiring a more 
compelling reason for the classification.198 
There is no doubt that challenging these 
policies in court will likely prove a long and difficult 
process, but taking into account the immense impact 
they have on students, it is an important cause. In 
addition to courtroom challenges, educators, parents 
and legislators should work together to come up 
with a solution that would be both appropriate for 
school children but also present a fair portrayal of 
homosexuality, so as to protect vulnerable children.199 
Ultimately, those who support these policies, and 
those who are fighting to change them, have the same 
goal in mind. Indisputably, the goal is to protect our 
children. The only question is whether both groups 
will be able to put aside their ideological differences 
in order to prevent further damage to children across 
the country. 
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